Sufism and Politics
Sufism and Politics
The Power of Spirituality

Paul L. Heck
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Since the 1950s, there have been many attempts to attract long-lasting influence on Sudanese party politics, while others have shown how and why the parties and their leaders have been able to do so. The period known as the colonial rule during the period of the British occupation has been addressed through the examination of the British role in the development of the modern political institutions of the Sudanese state. Several studies have shed light on the internal dynamics of the political parties, the role of the British, and the influence of various factors on the political landscape of the country. Despite the complexity of the political landscape and the challenges faced by the political parties, the Sudanese political landscape has evolved significantly in recent years, with new parties emerging and the traditional ones adapting to the changing political climate.

Introduction: The Shift Orders and Politics in the Sudan

RUDIGER SEESMANN

The Tihanyya and Islamic Rule in the Sudan:
Between Sufism and Islamism

Texts and Politics

EGYPRT, Middle East, 11-21.
52. Quoted from an interview with Hasib Al-Mahdi, Jumhuri (1985).
These studies, taken together, provide a comprehensive picture of the itinerary of the Anṣār and Khatmiyya and their political wings, the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (formerly National Unionist Party and People's Democratic Party), respectively. This scholarly focus, however, has given rise to questionable generalizations about the political nature and role of Sufism in the Sudan after 1956, the year of national independence. “Sectarianism” (tā’ifiyah) became the most popular catchword, in both political and scholarly discourse, suggesting that the two “sects” were keeping the country at the mercy of partisan interests. The portrayal of Sudanese politics as “sectarian” has profoundly influenced the perspective of scholars, especially the assessment of Anṣār and Khatmiyya political activity as the rule rather than exception, thus narrowing the focus of inquiry on the failure of other Sufi orders to act similarly. Instead of focusing on the specific circumstances under which the Anṣār and Khatmiyya leaders opted to become active players in the Sudanese political arena, there is a tendency to see lack of such involvement as a defect in need of explanation.

The preponderant attention given to the Anṣār and Khatmiyya as the two leading factions in Sudanese religious politics—joined in the 1980s by a third force, the National Islamic Front—has contributed to the persistent but erroneous classification of the Anṣār as a Sufi order. While Sufi doctrines did leave an imprint on the teachings of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi, Anṣār beliefs and practices cannot be described in terms of a Sufi path. The Mahdi repeatedly emphasized that all Sufi orders have been annulled with the emergence of his movement. In the title of a recent article on the Sufi orders during Mahdist rule, Sean O’Fahey eloquently describes this episode of Sudanese religious history as “Sufism in suspense.”

An important addition to the study of Sufism and politics in the Sudan is the monograph by Idris Salim El Hassan. He analyzes the religious policies of Ja’far Numayri, the former president of the Sudan who came to power through a military coup in 1969 and was ousted by a popular uprising in April 1985. El Hassan shows Numayri’s attempt to counter the opposition of the Anṣār and Khatmiyya by seeking the support of other Sufi orders less inclined to political involvement, such as the Sāmmānīyya, the Ismā‘īlīyya, and the different branches of the Qādirīyya. In the later years of his rule, Numayri introduced significant policy changes that formed the prelude to the latest chapter of Sudanese political history. The so-called National Reconciliation in 1977 not only paved the way for the assumption of political office by some Anṣār and Khatmiyya leaders, but also opened the door for Islamist entry into the inner circles of power under the leadership of Hasan al-Turabi, a development that led to the imposition of Shari‘a laws in September 1983 and culminated in the establishment of an Islamist government through yet another coup d’etat on June 30, 1989.

The itinerary of Sufism under Islamist rule has so far been a neglected issue in research on Islam and politics in the Sudan. A few years after the 1989 coup, O’Fahey briefly addressed the Islamist political strategy towards Sufism, describing it as avoiding an attack on Sufism per se, while criticizing the “sectarian” tendencies of some Sufi orders. Muhammad Mahmoud later stated that the political ascendency of the Islamists poses an “extremely difficult challenge” to the Sufi orders and concluded that “[t]he future of Sufism seems to depend largely on its ability to sustain its institutions on the one hand and to be an active expression of alternative Islam on the other.”

The present study offers the first detailed discussion of the Islamist challenge to Sufism in the Sudanese context, as well as an examination of how Sufi leaders have reacted to it. Instead of an account of political activity on the part of Sufi groups, the concern here will be a less visible part of the picture, namely the manner and extent of the influence of Islamist ideology and policy in transforming Sufi teachings and spreading a politicized understanding of Islam among Sufi leaders and followers, with a primary focus on the Tijāniyya, the Sufi order most familiar to this author. The Tijāniyya case can throw light on aspects of the relationship between Sufism and politics in the Sudan that have so far been overshadowed by the scholarly emphasis on the Anṣār and Khatmiyya and, more recently, on the Islamists. The approach taken here differs from most other studies in not limiting the perspective to the narrowly political. Instead, inquiry focuses on the moves and motives of the protagonists on both sides, representatives of the Islamist government and the leaders of the Tijāniyya. Although it is almost impossible to know exactly what people think of their actions, a closer look at the protagonists’ justification of their political positions, self-perceptions, and approaches to debate on matters of religion and politics can further our understanding of the complexities of Sufi politics in the Sudan and elsewhere.

The remainder of this study is divided into four sections. The first section, a summary of the basic political developments in the Sudan since the
Ismist coup of 1989, serves as background to the second section, which offers general considerations of the relationship between Sufism and politics and then a discussion of the Ismist regime’s policy towards Sufism and the Sufi orders. The third section introduces the case of the Tiqiiyya, especially the reaction of the order’s leading personalities to the Ism challenge, including examples of Tiqiiyya leaders who have occasionally been drawn into the political maneuvers of the regime. Based on the findings of this case study, the fourth and final section provides an assessment of the wider implications of Ism rule for the Sufi orders in the Sudan, concluding with remarks on the interplay of Sufism and Ism in the political arena.

The Political Background: Ism Rule in the Sudan

Sudanese Isms made their first significant political gains during the late 1970s when President Numayr sought the support of the country’s religious leaders. In the subsequent years, Hasan al-Turabi, charismatic leader of the Islamic Movement (al-harakat al-Islamiyya) as the Isms call themselves, was the architect of the shara laws, the implementation of which in September 1983 sparked the armed uprising of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in the southern parts of the country. Shortly before the overthrow of Numayr’s government in April 1985, al-Turabi had a falling out with the dictator, which led to his imprisonment. Thus did his timely separation from Numayr’s clique keep him from association with the misdeeds of the ancien regime.

By late 1985, al-Turabi re-emerged as founder of the National Islamic Front (NIF, al-jabha al-qawmiyya al-Islamiyya), a political party with an Ismist agenda that challenged the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the two traditionally dominant forces in Sudanese politics backed by the Ansar and Khatmiyya, respectively. The party’s name suggests al-Turabi’s vision of an organization that would overcome the divisions of Sudanese Muslims and unite them under the umbrella of a single movement with an Islamic agenda, thus bringing the era of “sectarian” politics to an end. Yet, in the elections of 1986, the NIF only finished third after the DUP and the Umma. The Ismist party, however, played a decisive role in the intricate power games that were to follow: al-Turabi was able to mobilize members of the country’s military elite for his cause. On June 30, 1989, when the ruling coalition of the Umma and the DUP was about to accept the SPLA’s demand for a secular constitution and the abolition of the shar’a laws, the military launched a successful coup d’état.

Immediately after the coup, the military government under the leadership of Umar Hassan al-Bashir imposed a ban on all political parties, the NIF included. Several party leaders were imprisoned; even al-Turabi initially found himself in prison again, a move widely interpreted as an attempt to cover up the real forces behind the Revolution of National Salvation (iswara al-inqith al-watami), as the coup came to be called in the official propaganda. Subsequent developments, however, quickly dispelled any doubts that the political agenda of National Salvation was the one designed by Hasan al-Turabi himself. Step by step, the new regime implemented its “Islamic Project” (al-mashri’i al-Islami), introducing a revised version of the shar’a-based penal law, centralizing the collection of the obligatory Islamic alms tax (zakat), convening international conferences attended by well-known Muslim radicals, holding meetings to design an “Islamic political system,” and drafting a new constitution. These measures were all accompanied by an intense propaganda campaign in the country’s media which depicted the opponents of the “Islamic Project” acting against the will of God.

Another development with far-reaching consequences occurred at the warfront in southern Sudan. Shortly after al-Bashir’s seizure of power, the regime began to issue official statements that described the war in the South as a jihad. Apart from regular troops, the government created the Popular Defense Forces (PDF, quwwat al-difa’ al-shabi) to recruit more combatants for its fight against the SPLA. Throughout the country, future “holy warriors” (mujahidin) were taken to training camps, occasionally by force, where they were taught the use of machine guns and the virtues of becoming a martyr (shahid) for the cause of God. In the mid-nineties, the height of jihad propaganda, the government-controlled media portrayed the Sudan as a nation of fearless fighters ready to die for the sake of the “Islamic Project.” According to the dualistic worldview of the Isms, there were only two choices: to be with their “civilizational orientation” (al-tawaff al-hadari) or against it.

In order to achieve the objectives of the “Islamic Project,” the National Salvation government adopted a twofold strategy. Outright opposition was
met with totalitarian measures, such as intimidation and imprisonment. As a consequence, most opposition leaders left the country and went into exile in Egypt, Eritrea, and Great Britain. At the same time, the regime sought to win the support of the Muslim population with al-Turābī acting, once more, as source of inspiration. In one of his major works on Islamic renewal (al-taqādīm al-islāmi), he argues that backwardness of Muslim societies is not the fault of Islam, but the result of its misinterpretation; needed was “the replacement of the inherited form of Islamic life” by the lost authentic form of Islam (al-islām al-ṣaḥīḥ),35 the implication being that Sudanese Muslims had yet to learn “real” Islam.

The task of enlightening the Sudanese about “real” Islam was partly assigned to the Ministry of Social Planning under the direction of ‘Alī ʿUthmān Muḥammad Ṭāḥā in the early 1990s. ‘Alī ʿUthmān had started as a leader of the Islamist student union at the University of Khartoum in the late 1960s and was to become vice president of the Sudan towards the end of the 1990s. In 1992, he created several new institutions and organizations, such as the People’s Police (al-shurṭa al-ṣāḥiyya) and the Comprehensive Call (to Islam; al-dāʿaʿa al-ṣāhīma), designed to eradicate “religious illiteracy” and ensure compliance with the “official” interpretation of Islam. The Comprehensive Call specifically targeted “detrital customs and traditions” (al-ʿādāt wa-l-taqādīm al-ṣāra), a reference to practices such as possession cults, consumption of millet beer, lengthy funeral celebrations, female genital mutilation, as well as visits to the graves of holy men, a practice closely associated with the Sufi orders.

By 1995, the military regime of ‘Umar al-Bashīr had taken a number of steps to transfer power to a civilian government. A body known as the National Congress (al-mu’tamar al-waṭani) was to fulfill the function of a parliament. That its first members were to be appointed by the President indicates a system of one-party rule. Opposition leaders in exile, most notably al-Ṣādiq al-Mahdi of the Umma Party and Muhammad ʿUthmān al-Mirghāni of the DUF, responded by holding a meeting in Asmara, where they founded the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The presidential elections of 1996 made a farce of the transition process when the military ruler al-Bashīr secured more than three-quarters of the votes. Hasan al-Turābī, while not appearing in an official government function, was widely considered as the directing hand behind the president.

In 1998, the government concluded its version of an “Islamic political system.” A group of experts had drafted a new constitution which passed through a popular referendum just before the ninth anniversary of the National Salvation. One of the crucial clauses of the constitution was paragraph 26 dealing with the question of political parties. This paragraph granted every Sudanese the right of “political association” (al-tawālī al-siyyāsī)—an odd phrase, as tawālī has no grammatical plural and never previously figured in the Arabic political dictionary.36 A later provision specified that citizens may set up associations to pursue political interests, provided they abide by the constitution. Within weeks of the government’s registration of the new associations in January 1999, it received more than twenty applications, most of which were granted. Since then, the associations have virtually mushroomed, although not yet allowed to participate in any election, with the National Congress the only party with a say in the government.

Also in 1999, the power struggle between ‘Umar al-Bashīr and Ḥasan al-Turābī came to a head.37 Already in 1998 there were rumors that al-Turābī, who had assumed the role of speaker of the Sudanese Parliament (i.e., the National Assembly, al-maṣfīs al-waṭani), had ambitions to replace al-Bashīr as president. In December 1999, al-Bashīr dissolved the National Assembly and put his rival under house arrest. Al-Turābī’s associates were removed from their posts, a move that turned former allies into enemies and divided the Islamists into two political camps: the National Congress, which remained loyal to al-Bashīr, and the newly established Popular Congress (al-mu’tamar al-ṣaḥīb), led by al-Turābī. As the defection of the Popular Congress threatened to undermine the government’s power base, al-Bashīr sought new political allies, finding them among some of the well-known forces of Sudanese politics.

Internal division was in no way limited to Islamists. In the aftermath of the tawālī act, the spirit of discord also affected the major opposition parties. Whereas the exiled leadership of the Umma Party rejected the new party system, a faction led by Mubārak al-Fāḍil al-Mahdī, cousin of al-Ṣādiq al-Mahdī, was allowed to register as a political association under the name of Umma Party for Reform and Renewal (ḥizb al-umma li-l-ʾislām wa-l-taqādīm). Ignoring the Cairo-based DUF leader Muḥammad ʿUthmān al-Mirghāni, Zayn al-Ābidīn al-Hindi submitted an application to register the DUF under the
new act, the group coming to be known as Democratic Union/al-Hindi Wing (al-itithād al-dimāqrātī/janāh al-Hindi). In 2000, al-Shāiq al-Mahdī decided to end his exile and reorganize the Umma Party within the country, registering as the National Umma Party (hizb al-umma al-qawmi). His return, however, left the exiled opposition in disarray, the National Democratic Alliance losing much of its political weight.

President al-Bashir took advantage of the situation by calling splinter groups to a power-sharing deal known as the National Program (al-barnāmij al-watani). Parties accepting the offer were Umma Party for Reform and Renewal, the al-Hindi Wing of the DUP, and a radical Islamist Party led by al-Turābī’s longstanding rival Shāiq ‘Abdallāh ‘Abd al-Majīd. Although al-Bashir succeeded in ousting al-Turābī and securing relatively broad support for the National Program, the government has continued to face severe challenges. In February 2003, while the Northern government tried to reach a peace agreement with the SPLA, another armed rebellion broke out in Darfur, the westernmost region of the Sudan, bringing the country back to the headlines of the Western media. Even though the two negotiating sides, led by Vice President ‘Ali Uthmān Muḥammad Ṭāha and the SPLA leader John Garang, finally signed a comprehensive peace treaty, including a plan to share power and resources, in early 2005, many obstacles remain that block the road to a final settlement of the conflict in the South. Garang’s tragic death in a helicopter crash in August 2005, a few weeks after his appointment to the office of the second vice president in the new, united government of Sudan, has fueled the fear that the fragile peace might ultimately not prevail.

As for Darfur, the UN Security Council has repeatedly considering imposing economic and political sanctions on the Sudanese government for its failure to disarm the Arab militias there, known as Janjaweed, who have been accused of atrocities against the non-Arab peoples of the region. Although government officials habitually deny their support for the Janjaweed, it is widely acknowledged that the regime has engaged the Janjaweed to assist the regular forces against the insurgents of the two Darfur rebel groups, the Sudanese Liberation Movement (ḥarakat tahrīr al-Sūdān) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM, ḥarakat al-‘aḍl wa-l-muṣāwa). With several leading figures within the JEM known to be associates of al-Turābī, the government suspects the ousted Islamist leader (who has spent the last four years in prison or under house arrest) of attempting a return to the game of power.

At the same time, there seems to be evidence that ‘Ali Uthmān Muḥammad Ṭāha, previously a close al-Turābī ally and now his archenemy, was personally involved in striking a weapon deal with Janjaweed leader Mūsā Hilāl. In that sense, the Darfur crisis functions as a proxy war between competing factions within the now deeply divided “Islamic Movement.”

Already by the late 1990s, the failure of the Islamists’ efforts to unite all Sudanese Muslims under the umbrella of a single Islamic identity had become evident. The peace agreement with the SPLA seems to have further accentuated the divisions among the northern populace. Even before the split within Islamist ranks, many Sudanese saw the all-pervading Islamic discourse as merely an attempt to distract public attention from the government’s inability to address the country’s considerable political challenges, such as the ailing economy (which has since shown signs of improvement with the discovery and export of oil) or the conflict in the South. There is no doubt that the “Islamic Project” has lost much of its impetus over the last few years. The “civilizational orientation,” omnipresent in public statements of government officials during the mid-1990s, has now disappeared from the Sudanese political lexicon. Only occasionally is Islamic rhetoric reemerge in political discourse, most recently in connection with the Darfur crisis. Alluding to the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Sudanese government officials have repeatedly accused the international community of exaggerating the dimension of the crisis as a pretext to launch yet another attack on a Muslim country. As explored below, the events in Darfur have recently moved the Tijāniyya, which has a strong presence in the western regions of the Sudan, onto the center stage of Sufi politics.

If there is anything the Islamist regime can claim to have accomplished, it is the division of the northern population along political, religious, and ethnic lines, not to mention the troubled relationship with the South. The policy of divide and rule has not only produced a split within many political parties, but also within the Sufi orders, to which we now turn.

Islamist Policy towards the Sufi Orders

First, brief consideration of the significance of Sufi political activity is in order. In the Sudanese context, few are the Sufi religious leaders who would openly question the Sufi consensus of avoiding politics. A major principle of
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BETWEEN SUNNAH AND ISLAMISM

The initial response and effort to instill the values of the Sunnah and the principles of Islam in the educational system and in the society at large was modest. The lack of resources and the fragmented nature of the educational system made it difficult to implement a comprehensive Islamic education program. Moreover, the influence of Western culture and secular ideologies challenged the traditional values and beliefs of the Muslim community.

A number of well-known scholars and institutions, such as Al-Azhar University and the Islamic Research Academy, were instrumental in promoting Islamic education. They provided resources, trained educators, and developed curricula that integrated Islamic teachings into the educational system. However, the impact of these efforts was limited due to various challenges, including funding constraints, lack of qualified educators, and resistance from certain segments of society.

One of the most significant advances in the educational approach during this time was the establishment of Islamic schools and universities. These institutions sought to provide a holistic education that emphasized moral values, religious principles, and Islamic culture. They differed significantly from the secular schools in their approach, curriculum, and pedagogy, and were often characterized by a strong emphasis on character development and moral education.

Despite these efforts, the educational system remained predominantly influenced by Western models and secular ideologies. The integration of Islamic teachings into the curriculum was often superficial, and the overall impact on students was limited. The challenge of balancing between Sunnah and Islamism persisted, and the need for a comprehensive and integrated approach to Islamic education remained. The movement towards a more holistic and culturally relevant educational system continued to be a significant issue, with ongoing debates and discussions about the role of Islamic education in shaping the future of Muslim societies.
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ized structure for the order, he urged local leaders to set up committees in charge of running the order’s affairs at the level of town and region, while a national committee was to act as link to the headquarters at ‘Ayn Māḏī, a small town in the Algerian desert where the khālij (i.e., successor) and most descendants of Ahmad al-Tijānī reside. After Sidi Ibn ‘Umar’s departure, however, it quickly became clear that the national committee did not wield sufficient authority to perform the function of centralized leadership.48

Despite efforts to attain greater unity, the order remained divided in various networks, usually headed by the descendants of the order’s pioneers in the Sudan, such as Muhammad al-Mukhtar al-Shinqiti (based at Berber and near the town of Shendi), Muhammad wad Dūlib (based at Khursi in Northern Kordofan), Shaykh Salmā (based at El Fasher in Northern Darfur), and Mudadthir Ibrahim al-Ḥajjāz (based in the Abū Rūf neighborhood of Omdurman).49 Occasionally, the sense of shared identity among the followers of the Tijāniyya embraces only those who trace their initiation back to a single family. At a practical level, competition more than cooperation characterizes the relationship between the different networks.

In the 1970s, competition turned into a virtual split when some leaders submitted to the authority of the Senegalese Shaykh Ibrahim Niassé (d. 1975).50 As in West Africa, Niassé’s teachings provoked heated debates both within and outside Sudanese Tijānī circles.51 Within a few years, the tarbiya (i.e., education) faction, as Niassé’s branch is known in the Sudan, was able to gain the upper hand in Darfur and Kordofan, the traditional strongholds of the Tijāniyya in the western parts of the country.52 In central and eastern Sudan, however, almost all leaders of the established families refused to recognize Ibrahim Niassé as the order’s supreme shaykh at the time, claiming that Niassé had abandoned the Tijāniyya and established an independent Sufi order.

This was not the end of dissension for the Sudanese Tijāniyya. Another conflict erupted in the mid-1980s, the main protagonists being Shaykh Ibrahim Sidi (1949–99), the grandson of Shaykh Salmā and head of the zāwiya in El Fasher, and the Sudanese disciples of Sharif Ibrahim Šālih (b. 1939), a Tijānī leader from Maiduguri (Nigeria);53 both shaykhs belonged to the tarbiya faction of the Tijāniyya. The conflict began with Ibrahim Sidi’s objections against a book published by Ibrahim Šālih in 1982 and entitled “Accusation of Unbelief (al-takfīr) is the Most Dangerous Innovation that Threatens the Peace and Unity among the Muslims in Nigeria.”54 The Nigerian Sharīf understood his book as a defense of Sufism in general and the Tijāniyya in particular, but several fellow Tijānī leaders saw his work as an unacceptable compromise with the opponents of Sufism. In a harsh reply entitled “The Deadly Poison Contained in the Book al-Takfīr...,” Ibrahim Sidi insisted that Ibrahim Šālih had contradicted basic tenets of Tijānī doctrine and had therefore forfeited his Tijānī membership.55 This accusation was met with outrage by the Sudanese followers of Ibrahim Šālih, especially in Darfur where many considered the Nigerian Sharīf the greatest contemporary representative of the Tijāniyya. Although several descendants of Ahmad al-Tijānī supported Ibrahim Sidi’s view,56 the majority of the order’s members in the Sudan remained loyal to Ibrahim Šālih.

With these divisions, Tijānī inability to emerge as a united force in Sudanese politics is hardly surprising. It would be misleading, however, to see the lack of unity as the only reason for the low political profile of the Tijāniyya. The principal reason lies in the fact that the Tijāniyya—unlike the Anṣār and Khātmiyya—has never actively pursued a political agenda as a group, and yet the nonexistence of such an agenda, along with the absence of a centralized national leadership, affords room for the different networks and local and regional leaders to carry out their political activities largely autonomously. As we will see, there are quite a few Tijānī representatives who have come to play a political role in the Sudan, especially after the Islamist coup of 1989.

The most illustrious Tijānī figure on the Sudanese political scene was none other than Ibrahim Šālih who, since the 1990s, has paid almost annual visits to his followers in the Sudan, while also meeting regularly with high-ranking politicians. In 1993, he was a special guest at the Conference of Remembrance, the event initiating the Islamist policy of courting “real” Sufis. When Ibrahim Šālih went to Khartoum again the following year, he was received as state visitor by the Sudanese government. In return, he publicly called all Tijānī followers to join forces with the Revolution of National Salvation and assist in the implementation of the government’s political program, also urging them to participate in the jihad in southern Sudan and contribute actively to the protection of the “Islamic state.” In a newspaper article entitled “The Tijāniyya Supports the Salvation Revolution,” he quoted as saying that “all threats and provocations notwithstanding-
The colonial powers will not let his Lord a minute

At the end of 1775, Governor-General Cornwallis, in his report to the British government, acknowledged the danger that the American colonists might use their newly gained independence to challenge British authority. He recommended a strong military presence in the colonies to prevent any further insurrection.

The American Revolution began in 1775 with a series of battles, including the Battles of Lexington and Concord. These events marked the start of the conflict that would lead to the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the eventual formation of the United States of America.

The American Revolution was not just a military conflict; it was also a struggle for political independence. The colonies sought to break free from British control and establish a new nation based on principles of liberty and democracy.

The end of the conflict came in 1783 with the Treaty of Paris, which formally ended the war and recognized the United States as an independent nation.

The American Revolution had a profound impact on the world, inspiring other nations to pursue their own paths to independence and freedom.
upon support from the Misr Order for the Future, the Muslim Brotherhood proposes to form a new political party, al-Tahrir. This new organization aims to give a voice to the disenfranchised and marginalized sectors of society. The party's platform focuses on social justice, economic equality, and political representation. Al-Tahrir envisions a future where the rights of all Egyptians are protected and the voice of the people is heard. The organization plans to work towards establishing a democratic system that truly reflects the will of the people. With its dedication to the principles of freedom, justice, and equality, al-Tahrir hopes to bring about positive change in Egypt. 

BETWEEN SUNNISM AND ISLAMISM

SUNNISM AND POLITICS
BETWEEN EUPHORIA AND ILLUSION

In the aftermath of the international fiasco of the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, governments worldwide have signed those covenants with pro-govern.

in which this manner of managing the other’s affairs is closely bound with the

interests of the world’s greatest powers. The resulting pressures to suppress the
dissident movement (which has been labeled a "counter-revolutionary"
uprising) are significant inasmuch as they were imposed on the country after the
election of a new government. The result is that, in many quarters, the
discussion of human rights is interpreted as a sign of disloyalty to the
regime or as a move to undermine the stability of the state. The
discussion of human rights is thus seen as a political device to

According to the proposal, a "group of selected people" should remain in
to the situation in the same time. Thatcher sent an official invitation to
attend the next visit to the country, he felt victim to a political plot.

The Mao project in this area was still alive. The so-called "people's power"
was hijacked to the way of the Falun Gong movement. The situation with which the government
has always been accused of making insufficient efforts to suppress the
new movement, which has also been labeled a "counter-revolutionary"
uprising. The Chinese government has been criticized for its use of
repressive tactics and for not acknowledging the rights of the
people to express their opinions freely. The government has been
accused of using violence to suppress the movement and of
violating the rights of its citizens. The government has also been
accused of using its power to control the media and to
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The situation in the country has been described as a
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BETWEEN SUNISM AND ISLAMISM

Conclusion:

The present state of religious and political affairs in the Sudan suggests a reassessment of the Sudanese Case.

Conclude that the "people of commitment" of the Sudanese Case, who are the leadership of the religious and political positions, have largely                                          }
The document appears to be discussing issues related to peace agreements, economic development, and political processes, particularly in the context of the Middle East. It mentions the difficulties in implementing peace agreements and the importance of economic development in stabilizing regions. The text also touches on the role of international organizations and the challenges they face in mediation and conflict resolution.

The document includes references to specific dates and events, suggesting a historical or analytical perspective on these issues. The text is dense and seems to be aimed at an audience with a strong interest in international relations and political science.